Abstract This paper utilizes means of game theory and option pricing to compute a bankruptcy triggering asset value. Combination of these two fields of economic study serves to separating the given problem into valuation of the payoffs, where we use option pricing and the analysis of strategic interactions between parties of a contract which could be designed and solved with the use of game theory. First of all, we design a contract between three parties each having a stake in the company, but with different rights reflected in the boundary conditions of the Black-Scholes equation. Then we will compute the values of debts and the whole value of the company. From here we directly compute the value of the firm's equity and optimize it from the point of view of managing shareholders. The theoretically computed bankruptcy triggering asset value is then compared to the actual stock price. Depending on this relation, we may say whether the company is likely to go under or not. Such knowledge is an example of the use of computational methods in sell-side analysis. In addition, this article also provides reader with a real-life case study of the investment bank Bear Stearns and the optimal bankruptcy strategy in this particular case. As we will observe, the bankruptcy trigger computed in this example could have served as a good guide for predicting fall of this investment bank. JEL Classification: C70, G32, G33.
Introduction
The aim of this paper is to provide an answer to a simple question: "At what share price shall an investor expect a company goes bankrupt?" Answering this question will be provided be means of the Game Theory Analysis of Options introduced in Ziegler (2004) . This useful method consists of two basic legs: game theory and option pricing. In the second part of this work we will attempt to provide an example of a listed company going bankrupt. In this example we will apply the theory to a real-life on the financial markets. This work could be further considered when building algorithmic trading models seeking for final warning values of the stocks traded.
The basic insight of the technique which we use in this chapter is separating a given problem into valuation of the payoffs and the analysis of strategic interactions between parties of a contract. We will handle the two separated parts by means of option pricing 2 and game theory, respectively. Ziegler in (2004) presents this method as an attempt to integrate game theory and option pricing. However, we see that this apparatus could be further enhanced by magnifying the amount of game theory tools integrated. According to Ziegler, this game theory analysis of options is applicable to the following:
• pricing of contingent claims and corporate securities when economic agents can behave strategically, • analysis of incentive effects of some common contractual financial arrangements, and • design of incentive contracts aiming at resolving conflicts of interest between economic agents.
Bankruptcy prediction has been studied since Altman (1968) using the z-score. Wilson and Sharda (1994) argue that Bankruptcy predictors using neural networks out-perform this previous discriminate type models. Most of the predictors, however, represent an econometric model, trying to fit the default data using whole range of explanatory variables as e.g. in logit model of Tseng and Lin (1998) . These statistical models usually do not capture effects of different law procedures as in François and Morellec (2004) , who theoretically studied the impact of the U.S. bankruptcy procedure with renegotiation possibility on the valuation of corporate securities and capital structure decisions. Moreover, the various incentives of stakeholders in the company also play an important and often omitted role in bankruptcy decisions. In this paper, we build a game theoretic model, which produces a bankruptcy triggering asset value in closed form based only on a small set of parameters.
The Method of Game Theory Analysis of Options
In the book The Game Theory Analysis of Options: Corporate Finance and Financial Intermediation (2004) Alexandre Ziegler attempts to combine game theory and option pricing. He argues that when he uses option pricing for obtaining players' future payoffs, these payoffs are arbitrage-free, discounted to the present and at the same time the price of risk is taken into account. Afterwards, he moves on with inserting these values into strategic games between the agents.
More tangibly, in our case, when we will try to find out the bankruptcy triggering asset value, we will set up a game of three parties all having a stake in a company. First of all, there will be a manager equity holder who will possess the shares of the company and run the firm. Secondly, there will be debt holders, who will buy the liability issued by the company, and at last, but not least there will be an investor interested in the company's dividend and trying to quit earlier than the business goes under.
Three-step methodology
Taking step back to introducing the method, it can be digested into the three main steps:
1. At first, the game is defined. The players' action sets, the sequence of their choices and the consequent payoffs are specified. 2. The second step is to value the players' future uncertain payoffs using option pricing theory. Players' possible actions enter the valuation formulas as parameters (for example the risk of the asset chosen by an agent). 3. The ultimate stage is utilizing the backward induction or sub-game perfection starting with the last period. Here the last period refers to the last decision to be made (for example computing the bankruptcy triggering asset value and then move backwards).
In classical game theory 3 the game is solved by considering expected utilities of all players. Here, Ziegler (2004) tries to replace expected utility maximization with the maximization of the value of an option. Furthermore, he claims that the main advantage over the classical approach lies in separating the valuation problem (step 2) from the strategic interactions analysis (step 3). By and large, this means that the analysis and solving the game can be frequently collapsed into finding a first-order condition for a maximum or minimum in the option's price at each decision node of the game, where we are handling uncertain payoffs.
To better grasp the practicalities of the method, let's consider a two players game, each choosing his or her optimal strategy: Player1 chooses strategy A and immediately afterwards Player2 chooses his strategy B. These strategies are mutually best responses and determine the ultimate current arbitrage-free payoffs given by G(A, B, S,t) for Player1 and H(A, B, S,t) for Player2. The players' strategies mean choosing one of the parameters of the differential equation
as well as its boundary conditions. In the last stage of the game, Player 2 chooses that strategy B, which maximizes his expected payoff:
provided that B is not a boundary solution. The solution yields an optimal strategy B = B(A, S,t), which might depend on Player1's strategy A, underlying asset's value S and time t. Player1 must anticipate Player2's consequent strategy choice B and maximize value of his own payoff, G, using first-order condition:
which yields an optimal strategy A = A(S,t), that may again depend on the value of the underlying asset and time. The term
in the first-order condition reflects the gist of backward induction, i.e. the indirect effect of Player1's strategy on his expected payoff that results from the influence his own choice has on Player2's optimal strategy B.
When is the method appropriate?
However appealing the visage of the method may be, it still has to satisfy some theoretical requirements to be appropriate. At first, we must answer the already mentioned issue: is an option value a good proxy for expected utility? First we should note that it is nicely translating uncertain future payoffs and adjusting them for risk to the present value, then we should realize that here is a monotonic increasing, however not necessarily linear, relationship between the option's value and agent's utility. This implies that any utility maximization choice by the agent is also optimizing the value of option and vice versa. The answer is then 'yes', it is a good proxy.
All of this is true under condition that the option's value is correct. And when it is correct? It is correct only in the case that the option pricing implicit adjustments on time and uncertainty are consistent with the underlying information structure and with agent's preferences. This statement needs a couple of words more for explanation. The main requirement is that the underlying asset's state-price density is lognormal. This will be the case for example, if the underlying asset's price follows a geometric Brownian motion and the risk-free rate is constant, or if the aggregate endowment in the economy follows a geometric Brownian motion and investors have constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility.
Ziegler moreover notes that the method does not require that the underlying asset S be traded to be applicable. We will essentially require only that there exists a traded security whose price is driven by the same Wiener process dB t as the underlying asset's value and investors can trade these securities continuously with zero transaction costs. This is because under these conditions, as shown by Brennan and Schwartz (1995) a continuously rebalanced self-financing portfolio can be constructed that replicates the underlying asset. In our case, we will consider only companies which were traded in high volumes on the stock exchange, e.g. Bear Stearns.
For what problems is it suitable?
The game theory analysis of options could be considered for the investigation of strategic interactions in which a direct evaluation of players' expected utilities is cumbersome.
At first, as mentioned above, it can well handle problems in which uncertainty takes place.
Secondly, it is suitable for problems in which the payoff time is not precisely specified and thus payoffs cannot be easily discounted. The time of the payoff may be driven by exogenous uncertainty alone, or may even depend endogenously on decisions made by the players 4 . The technique is suited to value payoffs that occur at random times and to analyze timing or optimal stopping problems. This all is again due to option pricing.
The third type of problems is the presence of option value in players' payoffs, i.e. when these payoffs are a nonlinear function of the underlying asset's value. This makes the method valuable in the field of real option analysis.
3 Bankruptcy triggering asset value
Introduction
In this section, we will draw our attention to determining a theoretical asset value, or price of a share, at which a bankruptcy is triggered. In other words, at the bankruptcy triggering asset value, the shareholders should switch from a long position and sell the shares before the company goes under. This is due to bankruptcy costs and the subordination of their claims in the company to the holders of company's debt.
The Model
Our model draws its resemblance to the model of Junior debt presented in Ziegler (2004) . Ziegler examined a situation of three parties having a stake in a company. At first, there were shareholders maximizing the value of equity in the company. Secondly, they issued a senior bond, which bore priority of being paid-off first in the case of bankruptcy. At third, the company issued a junior debt which was subordinated to the senior one meaning that the payments to the junior bond holders could be made only if the full promised payment to the senior debt holders has been made.
We have modified the model and replaced the junior bond by publicly offered shares. Thus the new setting is shaped by the decision of the following three stakeholders:
• Managing shareholders of the company, whose main interest is to maximize the value of the own equity of the company. In case of bankruptcy, paying off their stakes hold the least priority.
• Debt holders, who acquired the debt issued by the company. They are concerned about the regular interest payments and have absolute priority in case of bankruptcy.
• Investors, who are interested in buying the listed shares of the company. Their payoffs in case of bankruptcy enjoy priority over those of managing shareholders.
The sequence of events is following: at first, the company management issues a debt of the face value of D 1 at interest rate φ 1 . This debt is perpetual. Secondly, an investor into the company buys shares equivalent to the δ times the value of the firm's total assets after this purchase S, together δ S. Then managing shareholder chooses his optimal bankruptcy triggering asset value S * B , which maximizes the total value of the firm's own equity. Figure (1) may be helpful for better visualization of the setting.
The value of the firm's assets, S, is assumed to follow the geometric Brownian motion dS t = µS t dt + σ S t dB t .
Asset substitution is not possible, so that the parameters µ and σ are known to all parties. Asset sales are prohibited. Hence, any net cash outflows associated with interest payments must be financed by selling additional equity. The rate of return on the riskless asset is r.
We further assume that in order to finance a project, an agent borrows from a lender with whom he reaches the following agreement: in exchange of a loan F 1 , the borrower is to pay an instantaneous interest of φ 1 D 1 dt to the lender, where D 1 and φ 1 denote the face value of debt and the interest rate, respectively. Debt is assumed to be perpetual. Ziegler argues that perpetuality of the debt is a more realistic setting as the company does not usually finish its activities after the debt matures, rather acquires a new debt for its on-going business. Moreover, the perpetuity of the debt makes it easier to value the debt, as the partial differential equation turns into ordinary differential equation not depending on time t. Finally, assume that the borrower is able to acquire additional funds on an exchange through public offering of its shares. These shares are naturally subordinated to the debt. The company attains δ proportion of total assets S, δ ∈ (0, 1) in this way. Let the value of this claim denote by F 2 . However, in the event of bankruptcy, investor is eligible to require only the nominal value of the shares representing his stake in the company, i.e. D 2 , which equals number of the shares times nominal value of a share. 
The Value of the Company and its Securities
After we have specified the game, we need to value each player's payoffs using option pricing theory, treating all the players' decision variables as parameters. We can now compute the value of lender's claim F 1 .
Proposition 1 (The Value of Debt). If the current value of assets, S, follows geometric brownian motion and the contract is perpetual satisfying boundary conditions
r , then the value of the company's debt, F 1 , is given by
where γ ≡ 2r σ 2 . For computation of this proposition please see the appendix to this article (5). The meaning is that values of the senior debt equals the value of the perpetuity,
times the risk-neutral probability that the bankruptcy will not occur, 1 − (S/S B ) −γ , plus the payoff to the lender in the case that the bankruptcy takes place. This differs case by case, depending on the value disposable, (1 − α)S B being lower or bigger than D 1 .
Proposition 2 (The Value of Listed Shares).
If the current value of assets, S, follows geometric brownian motion and the contract is perpetual satisfying boundary conditions
, F 2 (∞) = δ S and F 2 (0) = 0, then the value of listed shares is given by
Deduction of this result is available in the appendix to this article (5) . The value of the listed equity can be interpreted as the value of the portion of the company's value less the value that could be lost for investor in case of bankruptcy times the probability of bankruptcy.
In eliciting the total value of the firm W , Ziegler draws on Leland (1994) and from there we know that the total value of the firm reflects three terms: the firm's asset value, S, the value of the tax deduction of interest payments, T B, less the value of bankruptcy costs, K. We can summarize the total value of the company in a proposition.
Proposition 3 (The Value of the Company). If the current value of assets, S follows geometric brownian motion, the current value of bankruptcy costs, K, satisfy the boundary conditions K(S B ) = αS B and K(∞) = 0, and moreover the current value of the tax benefits, T B, satisfy the boundaries T B(S B ) = 0 and T B(∞) = θ φ 1 D 1 r , then the total value of the company is given by
where γ ≡ 2r σ 2 . You can see the computation of this result in the appendix to this article (5). The above equation means that, the whole value of the company is given by the value of its assets S, plus the present value of tax shield, θ
r , times the risk-neutral probability that bankruptcy does not occur, minus the value lost in the case of bankruptcy, αS B , times risk-neutral probability of the company going under, (S/S B ) −γ . Provided that now we have calculated the total value of the firm, we may easily compute the value of equity, which will be maximized by the managing shareholder.
The Value of Equity
Hereby, we will give value of equity for both, an own equity and equity as a whole. The whole equity consists of own equity plus listed shares. The difference becomes apparent when the managing shareholders will start to maximize the value of each of them in separate cases. In the first case, they will maximize the value of the whole equity as they should have been supposed to. In the second case, they will only maximize the value of the equity in which they take the greatest stake-in the own equity. The distinction in the two options is that in the event of bankruptcy, the holders of own equity will participate on the break-up value only after the holders of listed shares have been satisfied in their claims on the company 5 .
Total Value of Equity
Firstly, we will give the value of whole equity. The value of equity is naturally a difference between the value of the firm, W , and the value of outstanding debt, F 1 :
Because we still do not know what will be the bankruptcy triggering asset value, S B , we have to compute the value of equity for two cases, please see the appendix (5) for the details of the computation. Here, we will state the final result:
The intuition behind what we have computed as the value of equity is very similar to the previous equations. It means that the value of equity is always given by a value of the asset S, minus the present value of the tax-adjusted cost of interest payments to the firm times the risk-neutral probability that bankruptcy does not occur, minus the value of assets lost in the event of bankruptcy times the risk-neutral probability of bankruptcy. 
The Value of Own Equity
In this part of the paper, we will compute the value of own equity. The value of own equity is apparently a difference between the value of the firm, W , the value of outstanding debt, F 1 , and the value of listed shares, F 2 :
The computation is again available in the appendix (5). The value of own equity then is:
In
Nevertheless, we are now adequately equipped to solve the optimization problem for the managing shareholder.
The Equity Holders' Optimal Bankruptcy Choice
In this chapter of the paper, we will compute the optimal bankruptcy strategies for managing shareholders i) when they are optimizing the whole value of equity and ii) when they maximize only the own equity. Consequently, we will compare the values and find the possible risks for the potential investors into the company.
The Equity Holders' Optimal Bankruptcy Choice for non-listed company
We will now determine the optimal bankruptcy strategy for equity holders. They are trying to set S B so as to maximize the current value of equity. This will be done by finding first-order conditions and solving for S B . We again distinguish two cases as we do not know what will be (1 − α)S B compared to D 1 :
Proposition 4 (The Equity Holders' Optimal Bankruptcy Choice for non-listed company). If the current value of assets, S, follows geometric brownian motion. The of value of equity is given by (10) , and moreover if S B > 0, then the optimal bankruptcy choice for the owners of the company maximizing the value of the equity is
For computation of this result see the appendix (5). These are the bankruptcy triggering asset values when we assume that managing shareholders of the company maximize the value of the whole equity. Let's now proceed to computation of bankruptcy triggering asset value for the case when they optimize only the own equity part of the whole equity.
The Equity Holders' Optimal Bankruptcy Choice for listed company
Let us now compute the bankruptcy triggering asset value S B for the managing shareholder optimizing only the own equity part of the whole equity. This proceeds similarly to previous part and involves finding first order conditions and solving for S B . We can again distinguish two cases in which (1 − α)S B is compared with the residual claims,
Proposition 5 (The Equity Holders' Optimal Bankruptcy Choice for listed company). If the current value of assets, S, follows geometric brownian motion. The of value of the own equity is given by (12) , and moreover if S B > 0, then the optimal bankruptcy choice for the owners of the company maximizing the value of the equity is
where γ ≡ 2r σ 2 . Computation of this result can be found in the appendix (5) . In comparison with the first branch of (13) we may see that the value is multiplied by term 1 1−δ which means that the more the company is leveraged, the lower is the bankruptcy triggering asset value. The value in the case of fully leveraged company coincides with the value for a non-listed company. Now we are sufficiently equipped to address the question of when the company goes bankrupt in different motivation schemes. In the next section we will apply this theoretical results to the case of investment bank Bear Stearns.
Case study: Bear Stearns
Credit crunch, Financial Crisis, Recession. . . These have been only some of the most frequently used vocabulary throughout 2008-09. In the times when the trust is lost, the financial markets and financial institution suffer hard because the capital moves extremely fast nowadays. The Wall Street investment bank established in 1923 and made public in 1985, Bear Stearns & Co. Inc., went bare and down due to its extreme exposure to CMOs, CDOs and another types of assets backed securities and structured products. After all, Bear seemed to Fed definitely "too big to fail" and bailed it out with the help of its fiduciary JP Morgan which then proposed an acquisition contract to which Bear agreed on 29 th of May 2008.
Throughout 2007 the stock Bear Stearns had been traded on the levels over USD 140 up to USD 170. The last weeks before the final Fed's decision on Bear Stearns you could see in the graph (3) the stock on the levels around USD 80 which was mainly in the line with the other companies from financial sector experiencing the economic downturn. After the Fed's decision, the stock immediately plunged into level of USD 2 from springboard of USD 60, which should have been the offer from JP Morgan. And a few days later adjusted to USD 10 which was the reconciled version of the acquisition prospect.
Nonetheless, from the point of academic researchers, it is a good opportunity, how to ascertain the usefulness of our models. Therefore, we are now about to compute the bankruptcy triggering asset value in case of Bear Stearns and compare it to the reality. The fact the company did not actually bankrupt is not important for our analysis, because in the end of the day the firm has been acquired by its peer after an eminent decrease in its value. Thus, this example is valuable for our analysis. Let us first have a look at the way of gathering the data.
Data extraction for the model
Equations for computing the bankruptcy triggering asset value (13) and (14) which we will use, have five and seven variables as their parameters, respectively.
1. tax rate θ 2. debt D 1 3. φ 1 as an interest rate on debt D 1 4. nominal value of the investors' shares D 2 5. δ ∈ [0, 1) as a current value of a stake in the company which investors hold 6. risk-free interest rate r, and 7. volatility of the stock σ .
We will use the Case 1 equations
as the value (1 − α)S B is less than D 1 + D 2 . It follows from our assumption that the final offered price of USD 10 per share was not higher than the value shareholders of Bear Stearns expected to receive upon bankruptcy. We also assume that "bankruptcy costs" are higher than 0. Now, we will calculate the parameters of S B . Let's start with tax rate.
The tax rate θ is computed as an average percentage tax shield of the company during the last three years 2005, 2006, 2007 from its profit and loss statements. We came to number of 32.4% what is very much in line with the corporate tax rate in the U.S. which is 35% 6 .
The amount of debt outstanding, D 1 , is taken directly from the company's 2007 balance sheet and amounts up to USD 383,569 million.
The interest rate on the debt was computed as interest expenses taken from the Bear's P&L 2007 statement, USD 10,206 million, divided by the debt D 1 . This equals to 2.66% which is a number achievable by bigger companies on nowadays financial markets.
Risk-free interest rate r is an interest rate on three years U.S. government bonds and its value is 4% 7 .
The last, but certainly not insignificant parameter to our equation is the volatility or standard deviation σ , which we calculated over the 2007 stock's performance and rebased into percentage equivalent. The value is 17.8% and σ 2 = 0.03.
We are now ready to give the bankruptcy asset triggering value for the case of Bear Stearns.
Computation of the bankruptcy triggering asset value
In this part of the paper, we apply our findings on a real-life case, on Bear Stearns case. We utilize the parameters we computed on the previous pages and insert them into equation (71). We get 
which we would like to compare with the actual stock price development. The re-basement will be done in the following manner: We have to compare comparable, so we would like to put on one side S * B per share and the share price on the other. Therefore, we multiply S * B by δ . δ stands here for a proportion of the whole market value of traded stocks in the assets on the balance sheet. We arrive to δ = 4.45%. Now, we multiply S * B by δ , we get 908, 879, 000. Finally, we divide this number by the number of common shares, 132, 738, 565, and obtain a per share bankruptcy triggering asset value S * B = USD 41.34. We may now insert this into figure (3) of the share price development. In case when managing shareholders maximize only their portion of the equity upon bankruptcy we basically multiply the first equation by the term From market data, we may observe that the warning call according to the optimal bankruptcy which we have computed, would occur during Friday 14 th of March 2008, where the high price was USD 54.79 and low USD 26.85. The situation going on was described by Stephen Labaton in New York Times (4.4.2008) by following:"The testimony disclosed that Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. had insisted that Bear be paid a very low price for its stock by JP Morgan Chase. The testimony also offered more details about the pressures on Bear. The firms chief executive, Alan D. Schwartz, said that he thought on the morning of Friday, March 14, that he had engineered a loan, backed by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, that bought him 28 days to find a solution. But he said he realized that he had misunderstood the terms of the loan when the Fed decided later that day that the loan would last only through the weekend and that he had only until Sunday afternoon to find a buyer for the 85-year-old firm. The testimony also disclosed that regulators were unaware of Bears precarious health and did not know until the afternoon of Thursday, March 13, that the firm was planning to file for bankruptcy protection the next morning." Drawing only to this one case study, we may see that the logic of our model could be applied on real-life on financial markets. If the investor sold his shares for proposed USD 41.34, he would not suffer the following loss of another 75% of the stock's price when it came down to USD 2 and stabilized on USD 10 after a bit more generous offer was made by JPMorgan.
However, there is a need for more thorough case studies and surveys to be undergone in order to precisely estimate the behavior of the model according to its parameters and, accordingly, to find ways how to calculate the variables as precisely as possible.
Conclusion
The combination of modern financial economics and microeconomics can produce very interesting insights into the real-life on financial markets. The game theory serves here to define strategic interactions between the players. The option pricing is used to translate uncertain future payoffs to the present value with a variety of use of its boundary conditions.
In this paper, we have utilized the approach proposed by Ziegler (2004) and combined the means of game theory and option pricing to compute the optimal bankruptcy strategy for owners of a listed company and non-listed company. Moreover, this value is given as an easily computable closed formula. This fact makes the method appealing when one considers programmable solution to the answer "At what share price is the company likely to go under?", producing a valuable warning signal.
In the last part of the paper, we have surveyed an authentic situation of the investment bank Bear Stearns. We have come to conclusion that the model derived is applicable on the real-life data and thus it is worth to examine its future applications and case studies in a thorough survey. The managing owners indeed tend to file for bankruptcy on higher stock price than they would do in the case they optimized the value for all shareholders. On the other hand, some other effects may take role as for example the hope that the company would be rescued and did not have to go under. This could create another incentive for waiting while the stock price falls further down.
Appendix 1: The Value of the Company and its Securities
The Value of Debt F 1 must satisfy the ordinary differential equation
which does not depend on time t as the contract is perpetual. The equation (18) has general solution
This solution is subject to boundary conditions
and
Boundary condition (20) means that what remains in the jar of assets after bankruptcy, 
Hence, we can write
Due to the fact that we do not know whether (1 − α)S B is bigger or lower than D 1 , we do not know which of the two values for boundary condition (20) to utilize. The result is that, we have to analyze two separate cases:
In this case, using condition (20) yields
By extracting α 2 we obtain
Therefore, the value of senior debt, F 1 , is given by
Case 2: (1 − α)S B ≥ D 1 In this case, using condition (20) yields
Solving for α 2 yields
Putting (26) and (29) together, gains the value of senior debt, F 1 , as
The Value of Listed Shares
The way to determine the value of the listed shares, F 2 , of the company would be very similar to what we have been doing on the previous pages while computing F 1 .
It also has to satisfy the differential equation (18) . Thus, F 2 must be of form
The difference lies in the boundary conditions applied. They are
In the case of the shares listed we need to utilize all three boundary conditions instead of only two applied in the case of debt. The reason is that condition (33) states, that also value F 2 approaches infinity with value of assets going beyond any boundaries, δ S → ∞ as S → ∞. The condition (32) means that if we take the same jar of what remained from assets after the bankruptcy, (1 − α)S B , as in the case of debt, we shall take a look into it and see if there remains something to satiate shareholders thirst. If yes, we will start pouring it into the pot of shareholders claims up to the level of D 2 or until we have anything to pour in there. The additional condition (34) is nothing less than when the value of firm is zero, also the value of the listed equity is zero. Let us now employ the boundaries to obtain the value F 2 .
From (33) we know that α 1 = δ , because α 2 S −2r/σ 2 approaches zero as S → ∞. Furthermore, using (34) we obtain that α 0 = 0 what implies that
In the sequel, we need to distinguish three cases stemming from the condition (32).
and following equation
with the following solution for α 2
Case 2:
Case 3:
When we gather all the results for each of the cases (36), (39) and (42) with different α 2 (38), (41) and (44) , we obtain the general solution for F 2 , depending on the volume of (1 − α)S B .
The current value of bankruptcy costs K must satisfy
with boundary conditions
Condition (47) says that at the time of bankruptcy, the value of bankruptcy costs equals αS B . Boundary (48) reflects that when the value of asset is very large, bankruptcy becomes irrelevant an thus the current value of bankruptcy costs is zero. From (47), α 0 = α 1 = 0, and from (48), we get
From here,
Therefore, the current value of bankruptcy costs is given by
For computing the tax benefits, we will make a use of the tax rate θ . Then the current value of the tax benefits, T B, must again satisfy
with boundary conditions T B(S B ) = 0
Boundary condition (53) says that the tax benefits are lost if bankruptcy occurs and condition (54) says that, as asset value becomes very large, the bankruptcy turns out as an irrelevant option and the value of the tax benefits is θ times the value of risk-free senior debt. 8 From (53), α 1 = 0 and α 0 = θ (
. Substituting into (46) and using (53) yields the condition
Solving for α 2 , we obtain
Hence, the current value of the tax benefits equals
Using (51) and (57), the total value of the firm, W , is given by
Appendix 2: The Value of Equity
Total Value of Equity
In this case, senior debt is worth
Hence, with subtracting F 1 from W , we get
The senior debt in this case is worth
The equity value now turns into
Putting (60) and (62) together, we obtain a summary for value E(S) of equity
The Value of Own Equity
and shares listed The senior debt in this case is worth
and shares listed 
Extracting S B and simplifying yields the optimal bankruptcy strategy 9 S * B = (1 − θ )
The result is that the optimal bankruptcy strategy S * B does not depend on the current asset value S is a quite interesting finding. 9 It is a maximum and not a minimum since 
Putting (71) and (73) together, gains the bankruptcy triggering asset value S * B which we are looking for
The Equity Holders' Optimal Bankruptcy Choice for listed company 
Extracting S B and simplifying yields the optimal bankruptcy strategy 11
The result is that the optimal bankruptcy strategy S * B does not depend on the current asset value S is a quite interesting finding. r − D 1 < 0, where the inequality stems from (73) and from that S B > 0. 11 It is a maximum and not a minimum since .
Putting (76) and (78) 
